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Abstract
This paper explores conditions under which inequality across social groups can emerge from
initially group-egalitarian distributions and persist across generations despite equality of eco-
nomic opportunity. These conditions arise from interactions among three factors: the extent of
segregation in social networks, the strength of interpersonal spillovers in human capital accumu-
lation, and the responsiveness of relative wages to the skill composition in production. Social
segregation is critical in generating these results: group inequality cannot emerge or persist un-
der conditions of equal opportunity unless segregation su¢ ciently great. We also show that if an
initially disadvantaged group is su¢ ciently small, integration above a threshold level can induce
both groups to invest more in human capital, while the opposite holds if the disadvantaged
group is large.
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Technologically modern societies are characterized by a broad range of occupations, some of which
require years of costly investment in the development of expertise, while others need only minimal
levels of training. Since investments in human capital must be adequately compensated in mar-
ket equilibrium, the persistence of substantial earnings disparities is a necessary consequence of a
modern production structure. What technology does not imply, however, is that members of par-
ticular social groups (identi￿ed, for instance, by race or religion) must be concentrated at di⁄erent
points in the income distribution. The fact that such concentration is widespread, persistent, and
arises in societies with widely varying histories and commitments to equal opportunity calls for an
explanation.
In some cases, contemporary inequality between social groups can be traced directly to a history
of systematic oppression. In the United States during slavery and the Jim Crow period, and in South
Africa under Apartheid, group membership based on a system of racial classi￿cation was a critical
determinant of economic opportunity. In the Indian subcontinent formal caste-based hierarchies
have been in place for centuries. However, not all instances of contemporary group inequality can
be traced to historical oppression. Many immigrants of European descent arrived in the United
States with little human or material wealth, but distinct ethnic groups have experienced strikingly
di⁄erent economic trajectories in subsequent generations. Similarly, hierarchical economic orders
such as the caste system and the early agrarian civilizations emerged from societies with little if
any political hierarchy or economic inequality. This suggests that economic inequality across social
groups might arise endogenously under certain conditions, without pre-existing discrimination or
group di⁄erences in ability or wealth.
There is a substantial theoretical literature in economics dealing with the intergenerational
dynamics of income distributions, but relatively little that deals explicitly with inequality between
social groups.1 The distinction is important because high levels of inequality among persons is
theoretically consistent with little or no inequality between groups. Put di⁄erently, while much
of the literature on inequality deals with measures of dispersion in the income distribution, group
inequality deals with the correlation between economic status and social identity. Understanding
the dynamics of group inequality therefore requires a model in which individuals di⁄er along at
least two dimensions, economic and social. We develop such a model here, and use it to identify
conditions under which group inequality can emerge from initially group-egalitarian states, and
1Two notable exceptions are Loury (1977) and Lundberg and Startz (1998). We discuss these and the broader
literature on inequality below.
2persist once it has emerged.
The structure of the model is as follows. All individuals belong to one of two social groups,
parents invest in the human capital of their children, and generations are overlapping. There are two
occupational categories, one of which requires a higher level of costly human capital investment than
the other. Investment costs depend both on an individual￿ s ability and on the level of human capital
in one￿ s social network. There are no credit constraints and investments are perfectly observable.
Wages in each period are determined under competitive conditions by the overall distribution of
human capital in the economy, and investment decisions are based on anticipated wages. There is
equal opportunity in the labor market, so wages depend only on one￿ s investment and not on one￿ s
group identity, and ability is identically distributed across groups. Nevertheless, if the initial state
is one of inequality, members of di⁄erent groups will invest at di⁄erent rates when there is some
degree of segregation in social networks and peer e⁄ects exist.
The central question of interest pertains to the limiting properties of equilibrium paths. We show
that under certain conditions, there exists no stable steady state with equality across groups. In this
case, small initial group di⁄erences will be ampli￿ed over time, resulting in a correlation between
earnings and identity even if no such correlation exists to begin with. These conditions depend on
interactions involving three factors: the extent of segregation in social networks, the strength of
interpersonal spillovers in human capital accumulation, and the level of complementarity between
high and low skill labor in the process of production. In particular, social segregation plays a
critical role: group inequality cannot emerge or persist under conditions of equal opportunity
unless segregation is su¢ ciently great. Furthermore, the relationship between group equality and
social segregation is characterized by a discontinuity: there exists a critical level of segregation such
that convergence to group equality occurs if and only if segregation lies below this threshold. If
segregation lies above the threshold, convergence over time to group equality is impossible from
almost any initial state. Hence a small increase in social integration, if it takes the economy
across the threshold, may have large e⁄ects on long run group inequality, while a large increase in
integration that does not cross the threshold may have no persistent e⁄ect.
We also examine a special case of the model with a given human capital wage premium and
multiple symmetric steady states (each of which entails group equality). Again we ￿nd that group
inequality can be sustained if and only if segregation is su¢ ciently high, so integration can be
equalizing if it proceeds beyond a threshold. However, since there are multiple steady states with
group equality, this raises the question of which one is selected when equalization occurs. Here
we ￿nd that the population share of the initially disadvantaged group plays a critical role. If this
3share is su¢ ciently small, integration can result not only in the equalization of income distributions
across groups, but also in an increase in the levels of human capital in both groups. Under these
conditions integration might be expected to have widespread popular support. On the other hand,
if the population share of the initially disadvantaged group is su¢ ciently large, integration can
give rise to a decline in human capital in both groups and, if this result is anticipated, may face
widespread popular resistance.
Our main point is that even in the complete absence of market discrimination and credit con-
straints, group inequality can emerge and persist inde￿nitely as long as signi￿cant social segre-
gation endures. Furthermore, declining segregation can have discontinuous e⁄ects on long run
group inequality, with welfare e⁄ects that depend on demographic structure of the population.
These ￿ndings are relevant to the debate over the appropriate policy response to a history of overt
discrimination. Procedural or rule-oriented approaches emphasize the vigorous enforcement of anti-
discrimination statutes and the establishment of equal opportunity. Substantive or results-oriented
approaches advocate group-redistributive remedies such as a¢ rmative action or reparations. Our
results suggest that there are conditions under which group inequality will persist inde￿nitely even
in the presence of equal economic opportunity. In fact, when no stable steady state with group
equality exists, even redistributive policies will be ine⁄ective as long as they are temporary. In
this case the only path to equality in income distributions across groups is an increase in social
integration.
The relationship between segregation and the dynamics of group inequality has been explored
previously by Loury (1977) and Lundberg and Startz (1998). Loury introduced the ￿rst dynamic
model of group inequality with a view to exploring conditions under which equal opportunity in
contractual relations would lead to the eventual convergence of income distributions across groups.
His model contains many of the ingredients that we consider here, including peer e⁄ects, segregation,
and the endogenous determination of wages, and he establishes that convergence to group equality
occurs under weak conditions if there is no segregation by race. Such convergence need not occur
when communities are segregated. Loury does not, however, provide su¢ cient conditions for the
persistence or emergence of group inequality, a signi￿cant gap that we attempt here to ￿ll.
Lundberg and Startz (1998) explore a model in which community human capital a⁄ects both
current output and the returns to investment in the human capital of the next generation. They
model social groups as essentially distinct economies, except for the possibility that the human
capital of the majority group has a spillover e⁄ect on the production of human capital in the
minority group. The size of this spillover e⁄ect is interpreted as the level of segregation. Their
4model gives rise to equality across groups in the steady state growth rate of income and human
capital, although convergence to the steady state may be very slow when segregation is high.
Moreover, unless segregation is complete (in which case the two groups function as truly separate
economies) there is eventual equalization not just in growth rates but also in income levels. In
contrast, we identify conditions under which group equality cannot be sustained no matter how
narrow the initial inequality between groups may be. Attempts at equalization in this case will
either be futile, or will lead to a reversal of roles and an inversion of the initial hierarchy. In fact,
our model shows not only how group inequality can persist, but also how it could emerge from
initially group-egalitarian structures.
Our work is also connected to the broader literature on the intergenerational dynamics of income
distributions, especially the work on socioeconomic strati￿cation and inequality by Benabou (1993,
1996a, 1996b) and Durlauf (1996).2 As in our model, local complementarities (which may be
￿scal or interpersonal) play a critical role in sustaining inequality across generations, since the
rich separate themselves from the poor through the process of neighborhood sorting. However,
since individuals vary along just a single dimension, the issue of a correlation between economic
success and social identity cannot be fully explored in this framework. For instance, members of
di⁄erent social groups could, in principle, be well represented in both rich and poor communities.
Despite this di⁄erence, many of the mechanisms that sustain group inequality in our model are
also operational in this work, and our ￿ndings about the possible futility of redistributive policies
echoes conclusions reached by Benabou (1996b).
One channel through which group inequality can be sustained across generations is through
discrimination, either motivated by hostility as in Becker (1957), or by incomplete information
about individual productivity as in the theory of statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973, Phelps,
1972).3 Since we assume that human capital investments are perfectly observable, there is no
scope for statistical discrimination in our model. This is not to deny the importance of stereotypes
in economic life, but to maintain focus of the role of peer-e⁄ects, segregation, and production
complementarities. We also abstract from credit constraints, assuming instead that parents can
always ￿nance human capital investments in their children if the future bene￿ts from doing so
outweigh the current costs, regardless of parental income levels. Again, we do so not to deny the
empirical importance of credit constraints, but rather to identify mechanisms that can allow group
2See also Becker and Tomes (1979), Loury (1981), Banerjee and Newman 1993, Galor and Zeira 1993, and
Mookherjee and Ray (2003).
3There is a vast literaure dealing with these mechanisms; see, for instance, Coate and Loury (1993), Antonovics
(2002), Moro and Norman (2004) and Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008).
5inequality to emerge and persist even when such constraints are not binding.
2 The Model
Consider a society that exists over an in￿nite sequence of generations and at any date t = 0;1;:::
consists of a continuum of workers of unit measure. The workers live for two periods acquiring
human capital in the ￿rst period of life and working for wages in the second. The generations
overlap, so that each young worker (i.e. the child) is attached to an older worker (the parent). For
convenience, we assume that each worker has only one child. There are two occupations, of which
one requires skills while the other may be performed by unskilled workers. Total output in period t
is given by the production function f(ht;lt); where ht is the proportion of workers assigned to high-
skill jobs, and lt = 1￿ht: Only workers who have invested in human capital can be assigned to high
skill jobs, so ht ￿ st; where st is the proportion of the population that is quali￿ed to perform skilled
jobs at date t: The production function satis￿es constant returns to scale, diminishing marginal
returns to each factor, and the conditions lims!0 f1 = lims!1 f2 = 1: Given these assumptions
the marginal product of high (low) skill workers is strictly decreasing (increasing) in ht. Let ~ h
denote the value of h at which the two marginal products are equal. Since quali￿ed workers can
be assigned to either occupation, we must have ht = minfst;~ hg: Wages earned by high and low
skill workers are equal to their respective marginal products, and are denoted wh(st) and wl(st)
respectively. The wage di⁄erential ￿(st) = wh(st)￿wl(st) is positive and decreasing in st provided
that st < ~ h; and satis￿es lims!0 ￿(s) = 1: Furthermore, ￿(s) = 0 for all s ￿ ~ h: Since investment
in human capital is costly, st ￿ ~ h will never occur along an equilibrium path.
The population of workers consists of two disjoint groups, labelled 1 and 2, having population
shares ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ respectively. Let s1
t and s2
t denote the two within-group (high) skill shares at
date t. The mean skill share in the overall population is then
st = ￿s1
t + (1 ￿ ￿)s2
t: (1)
The costs of skill acquisition are subject to human capital spillovers and depend on the skill level
among one￿ s set of social a¢ liates. These costs may therefore di⁄er across groups if the within-
group skill shares di⁄er, and if there is some degree of segregation in social contact. Suppose that
for each individual, a proportion ￿ of social a¢ liates is drawn from the group to which he belongs,
while the remaining (1 ￿ ￿) are randomly drawn from the overall population. We assume that ￿ is
the same for both groups. Then a proportion ￿+(1 ￿ ￿)￿ of a group 1 individual￿ s social a¢ liates
6will also be in group 1, while a proportion ￿+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) of a group 2 individual￿ s a¢ liates will
be in group 2.
The parameter ￿ is sometimes refereed to as the correlation ratio (Denton and Massey, 1988).
In the Texas schools studied by Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002), for example, 39 percent of
black third grade students￿classmates were black, while 9 percent of white students classmates
were black. Thus if schoolmates were the only relevant a¢ liates, ￿ would be 0.3. The relevant
social network depends on the question under study: for the acquisition of human capital, parents
and (to a lesser extent) siblings and other relatives are among the strongest in￿ uences. Because
family members are most often of the same group, the social networks relevant to our model may
be very highly segregated.
Let ￿i
t denote the mean level of human capital in the social network of an individual belonging
to group i 2 f1;2g at time t: This depends on the levels of human capital in each of the two groups,
as well as the extent of segregation ￿ as follows:
￿i
t = ￿si
t + (1 ￿ ￿)st: (2)
In a perfectly integrated society, the mean level of human capital in one￿ s social network would
simply equal st on average, regardless of one￿ s own group membership. When networks are char-
acterized by some degree of assortation, however, the mean level of human capital in the social
network of an individual belonging to group i will lie somewhere between one￿ s own-group skill
share and that of the population at large. Except in the case of perfect integration (￿ = 0); ￿1
t and
￿2
t will di⁄er as long as s1
t and s2
t di⁄er.
The costs of acquiring skills depend on one￿ s ability, as well as the mean human capital within
one￿ s social network. By ￿ ability￿we do not mean simply learning capacity, or cognitive measures
such as IQ, but rather any personal characteristic of the individual a⁄ecting the costs of acquiring
human capital, including such things as the tolerance for classroom discipline or the anxiety one
may experience in school. The distribution of ability is assumed to be the same in the two groups,
consistent with Loury￿ s (2002) axiom of anti-essentialism. Hence any di⁄erences across groups in
economic behavior or outcomes arise endogenously in the model, and cannot be traced back to
any di⁄erences in fundamentals. The (common) distribution of ability is given by the distribution
function G(a); with support [0;1): Let c(a;￿) denote the costs of acquiring human capital, where c
is non-negative and bounded, strictly decreasing in both arguments, and satis￿es lima!1 c(a;￿) = 0
for all ￿ 2 [0;1]:
The bene￿t of human capital accumulation is simply the wage di⁄erential ￿(st); which is identical
7across groups. That is, there is no unequal treatment of groups in the labor market. Individuals
acquire human capital if the cost of doing so is less than the wage di⁄erential. (Note that the costs
are incurred by parents while the bene￿ts accrue at a later date to their children. Hence we are
assuming that parents fully internalize the preferences of their children and, to simplify, that they
do not discount the future.) Thus the skill shares si
t in period t are determined by the investment
choices made in the previous period, which in turn depend on the social network human capital
￿i
t￿1 in the two groups, as well as the anticipated future wage di⁄erential ￿(st): Speci￿cally, for
each group i in period t￿1; there is some threshold ability level ~ a(￿(st);￿i
t￿1) such that those with
ability above this threshold accumulate human capital and those below do not. This threshold is
de￿ned implicitly as the value of ~ a that satis￿es
c(~ a;￿i
t￿1) = ￿(st) (3)
Note that ~ a(￿(st);￿i
t￿1) is decreasing in both arguments. Individuals acquire skills at lower ability
thresholds if the expect a greater wage di⁄erential, or if their social networks are richer in human
capital. It is also clear from (2) and (3) that for given levels of human capital attainment in the
two groups, increased segregation raises the costs of the disadvantaged group and lowers the costs
of the advantaged group. The share of each group i that is skilled in period t is simply the fraction
of the group that has ability greater than ~ a(￿(st);￿i
t￿1). Thus we obtain the following dynamics:
si
t = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿(st);￿i
t￿1); (4)
for each i 2 f1;2g: Given an initial state (s1
0;s2







t=1 that satis￿es (1￿ 4).
The following result rules out the possibility that there may be multiple equilibrium paths
originating at a given initial state (all proofs are collected in the appendix).
Proposition 1. Given any initial state (s1
0;s2











t for all t along the equilibrium path.
Proposition 1 ensures that the group with initially lower skill share, which may assume without
loss of generality to be group 1; cannot ￿leapfrog￿the other group along an equilibrium path. A
key question of interest here is whether or not, given an initial state of group inequality (s1
0 < s2
0),
the two skill shares will converge asymptotically (limt!1 s1
t = limt!1 s2
t):
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0) for all periods t: Of partic-
ular interest are symmetric steady states, which satisfy the additional condition s1
t = s2
t: At any
symmetric steady state, the common skill share st must be a solution to
s = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿(s);s)):
Since costs are bounded and lims!0 ￿(s) = 1; we have lims!0 ~ a(￿(s);s) = 0: And since ￿(1) = 0,
lims!1 ~ a(￿(s);s) = 1: Hence there must exist at least one symmetric steady state. There will be
exactly one such state if ~ a(￿(s);s) is strictly increasing in s at any such state, or
d~ a
ds
= ~ a1￿0 + ~ a2 > 0; (5)
where ~ a1 and ~ a2 denote the partial derivatives of ~ a with respect to its two arguments. Condition
(5) requires that peer e⁄ects are not so strong as to o⁄set the general equilibrium impact of higher
skill shares on relative wages. Note that this need not be the case globally: as long as (5) is satis￿ed
at each symmetric steady state, there can be only one such state. We shall assume for the moment
that this is indeed the case, and consider the multiplicity of symmetric steady states in the section
to follow.
As a benchmark, consider the case in which the population consists of a single group rather
than two. Then the dynamics (4) simplify to the one-dimensional system
st = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿(st);st￿1): (6)
In this case, condition (5) implies not just the uniqueness of the steady state, but also its local
asymptotic stability:
Proposition 2. Suppose (5) is satis￿ed and the population consists of a single group. Then there
is a unique and locally asymptotically stable steady state.
An immediate corollary of this is that in the two group model, if the human capital shares in the
two groups are initially identical and su¢ ciently close to the unique symmetric steady state, the
economy will converge to that state. This need not be the case, however, if the initial state is one
with group inequality, as the following example illustrates.
Example 1. Suppose ￿ = 0:25; f(h;l) = h0:7l0:3; G(a) = 1 ￿ e￿0:1a; and c(a;￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ + 1=a:
Then there is a unique symmetric steady state (s1;s2) = (0:26;0:26): There exists ^ ￿ ￿ 0:21 such
9that if ￿ < ^ ￿ the symmetric steady state is locally asymptotically stable, and if ￿ > ^ ￿ the symmetric
steady state is locally unstable. (Figure 1 shows the paths of investment shares for ￿ = 0:10 and
￿ = 0:30 respectively.)

















































Figure 1. Dynamics of investment shares for two di⁄erent segregation levels.
Example 1 illustrates that, starting from a state in which the two groups are unequal with respect
to human capital investment, group inequality can persist inde￿nitely if the level of segregation is
su¢ ciently high. In this example, a small increase in integration can destabilize an asymmetric
steady state and result in a transition to equality. This lowers skill levels among the initially
advantaged group but raises them among the initially disadvantaged. The e⁄ect on the overall
skill share and wages is ambiguous in general. There is a loss in welfare for those in group 2 who
invest in the asymmetric steady state (regardless of whether or not they continue to invest in the
symmetric steady state). This is because their costs of investment rise. Correspondingly there is a
gain in welfare for those in group 1 who invest in the symmetric steady state (regardless of whether
or not they invested in the asymmetric steady state).
This example illustrates a robust phenomenon that holds under quite general conditions. Since
10there exists a unique competitive equilibrium path from any initial state (s1
0;s2
0); we may write (4)






fi = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿(￿f1 + (1 ￿ ￿)f2);￿si
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿s1
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)s2
t￿1)): (8)
Note that condition (5), which ensures uniqueness of the symmetric steady state, implies that
G0~ a1￿0 > G0 j~ a2j: In addition to this, we assume
G0 j~ a2j > 1: (9)
This assumption states that, at the symmetric steady state, the e⁄ect of an increase in the level of
human capital in one￿ s peer-group on the proportion who choose to invest is not too small. This
could be because the ability threshold is su¢ ciently responsive to changes in peer-group quality
and/or because the distribution function is steep at this state. Unless (9) holds, the symmetric
steady state will be locally asymptotically stable at all levels of segregation. Our main result is the
following.
Theorem 1. If (5) and (9) hold, then there exists a level of segregation ^ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that the
unique symmetric steady state is locally asymptotically stable if ￿ < ^ ￿; and unstable if ￿ > ^ ￿:
Theorem 1 implies that when segregation is su¢ ciently great, group equality cannot be attained
even asymptotically, no matter what the initial conditions may be. Initial disparities will persist
even under a regime of fully enforced equal opportunity. Moreover, even group-redistributive poli-
cies can only maintain group equality as long as they are permanently in place. Any temporary
policy of redistribution will either be futile in the long run, or result in a reversal of roles in the
social hierarchy.
This conclusion depends critically on our assumption that the degree of segregation is exogenous
and is not itself in￿ uenced by the level of group di⁄erence in human capital. It might realistically
be assumed that more equal educational attainments, if sustained in the long run, might reduce
group based assortment in friendships, parenting, and other social realms. While we do not explore
this possibility explicitly, this would not qualitatively a⁄ect either the low segregation symmetrical
outcome in the top panel of ￿gure 1 or the high segregation asymmetrical outcome in the second
panel, for in both the pattern of human capital attainments would tend to perpetuate the assumed
level of segregation. But making the degree of segmentation endogenous in this manner would alter
11the basins of attraction of the two equilibria, making the symmetric equilibrium unattainable from
highly unequal initial conditions and the asymmetric equilibrium unattainable from highly equal
initial conditions.
On the other hand, a policy of social integration can stabilize the symmetric steady state and
give rise over time to a convergence of incomes across groups, provided that the policy is e⁄ective
in raising the level of integration beyond the required threshold. We discuss the feasibility of such
a policy below, but ￿rst examine the possibility of multiple symmetric steady states.
4 Multiplicity and Coordination
We have assumed to this point that there is a unique symmetric steady state. But if condition (5)
fails to hold, there may be multiple symmetric steady states, which raises the question of which one
is selected when integration results in equality of group outcomes. It turns out that the population
share of the initially disadvantaged group plays a critical role in this regard.
In order to allow for multiplicity of symmetric steady states, (5) must be violated. This happens
trivially if relative wages are completely inelastic: ￿(st) = ￿ ￿ for all periods t: In this case the
dynamics of skill shares satisfy
si
t = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;￿i
t￿1):
Consider the case of complete segregation, corresponding to ￿ = 1. In this case ￿i
t = si
t for each
group i and so
si
t = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;si
t￿1)): (10)
In any steady state, we must have
si
t = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;si
t)); (11)
for all t; so group inequality can persist if and only if (11) admits multiple solutions. In general the
existence of multiple solutions will depend on details of the distribution and cost functions which
we will explore presently. But to clarify the logic of the argument, we begin with a simple case in
which all individuals have the same ability.
Suppose that all individuals have the same ability ￿ a, so the cost function is c(￿ a;￿). In this
case the only stable steady states involve homogeneous skill levels within groups. (There may exist
equilibria in which members of a group are all indi⁄erent between acquiring human capital and not
doing so, and make heterogeneous choices in the exact proportions that maintain this indi⁄erence,
12but such equilibria are dynamically unstable and we do not consider them.) Suppose that
c(￿ a;1) < ￿ ￿ < c(￿ a;0); (12)






= (1;1) are stable steady states at all levels




= (0;1) is a stable steady state. De￿ne ~ ￿ as the group 1 population share at
which c(￿ a;1 ￿ ~ ￿) = ￿ ￿: This is the value of ￿ for which, under complete integration, the costs of




￿i = 1 ￿ ￿ for both groups.) There is a unique ~ ￿ 2 (0;1) satisfying this condition since c(￿ a;￿) is
decreasing in ￿ and satis￿es (12). We then have




= (0;1) exists if and only if ￿ > ^ ￿(￿): The function ^ ￿(￿) is positive and
decreasing for all ￿ < ~ ￿; positive and increasing for all ￿ > ~ ￿, and satis￿es ^ ￿(~ ￿) = 0:
Hence group inequality can persist if segregation is su¢ ciently high, where the threshold level
of segregation itself depends systematically on the population share ￿ of the disadvantaged group.
If segregation declines to a point below this threshold, group inequality can no longer be sustained.
In this case convergence to a symmetric steady state must occur. However, there are two of these






= (1;1) are stable steady states at all levels of
segregation ￿: Convergence to the former implies that equality is attained through increased costs
and hence declines in the human capital of the initially advantaged group. Convergence to the
latter, in contrast, occurs through reductions in costs and therefore increases in the human capital
of the initially disadvantaged group. The following result establishes that convergence to the high
human capital state occurs if and only if the population share of the initially disadvantaged group
is su¢ ciently low.








= (1;1) if ￿ < ~ ￿; and to
￿
s1;s2￿
= (0;0) if ￿ > ~ ￿:
13Figure 2. Segregation, population shares, and persistent inequality
Propositions 3-4 are summarized in Figure 2, which identi￿es three regimes in the space of
parameters ￿ and ￿: For any value of ￿ (other than ~ ￿); there is a segregation level ^ ￿(￿) 2 (0;1) such
that group inequality can persist only if segregation lies above this threshold. If segregation drops
below the threshold, the result is a sharp adjustment in human capital and convergence to equality.
This convergence will result from a decline in the human capital of the initially advantaged group if
the population share of the initially disadvantaged group is large enough (i.e. ￿ > ~ ￿). Alternatively,
it will result from a rise in the human capital of the disadvantaged group if it￿ s population share is
su¢ ciently small. The threshold segregation level itself varies with ￿ non-monotonically. When ￿




Increasing ￿ lowers ￿1 and hence raises c(￿ a;￿1), which implies that c(￿ a;￿1) = ￿ ￿ holds at a lower
level of ￿: Hence ^ ￿(￿) is decreasing in this range, implying that higher values ￿ require higher levels
of integration before the transition to equality is triggered. When ￿ is larger than ~ ￿, however, ^ ￿(￿)
is the locus of pairs of ￿ and ￿ such that c(￿ a;￿2) = ￿ ￿ at the state
￿
s1;s2￿
= (0;1): Increasing ￿
lowers ￿2 and hence raises c(￿ a;￿2), which implies that c(￿ a;￿2) = ￿ ￿ holds at a higher level of ￿:
14Hence ^ ￿(￿) is increasing in this range, and higher values of ￿ require lower levels of integration in
order to induce the shift to equality.
Greater integration within the regime of persistent inequality raises the costs to the advantaged
group and lowers costs to the disadvantaged group. Hence one might expect integration to be
resisted by the former and supported by the latter. Note, however, that this is no longer the case if
a transition to a di⁄erent regime occurs. In this case, when ￿ is small, both groups end up investing
in human capital as a consequence of integration and as a result enjoy lower costs of investment.
But when ￿ is large, integration policies that reduce ￿ below ^ ￿ (￿) will result in higher steady state
costs of human capital accumulation for both groups, with the consequence that no human capital
investment is undertaken. Hence both groups have an incentive to support integrationist policies
if ￿ is small, and both might resist such policies on purely economic grounds if ￿ is large. (This
e⁄ect arises also in Chaudhuri and Sethi, 2007, which deals with the consequences of integration in
the presence of statistical discrimination.)
The simple model with homogeneous ability delivers a number of insights, but also has several
shortcomings. There is no behavioral heterogeneity within groups, and all steady states are at the
boundaries of the state space. Changes in segregation only a⁄ect human capital decisions if they
result in a transition from one regime to another; within a given regime changes in social network
quality a⁄ect costs but do not induce any behavioral response. Furthermore, even when transitions
to another regime occur, human capital decisions are a⁄ected in only one of the two groups. Finally,
convergence to a steady state occurs in a single period. These shortcomings do not arise when the
model is generalized to allow for heterogeneous ability within groups, which we consider next.
Suppose that ability is heterogenous within groups (though distributed identically across groups).
As noted above, multiple steady states will exist under complete segregation if and only if there
are multiple solutions to equation (11). Given our assumptions on the cost function, G(~ a(￿ ￿;0)) < 1
and G(~ a(￿ ￿;1)) < 0; meaning that some (but not all) individuals in each group will acquire human
capital in any steady state. This implies that (11) must have an odd number of solutions for
generic parameter values, so if there are multiple solutions there must be at least three. We shall
assume that there are precisely three, and let sl and sh respectively denote the smallest and largest
solutions. Then there are two stable symmetric steady states (sl;sl) and (sh;sh) at all levels of
segregation ￿; and the pair (sl;sh) is an asymmetric stable steady state when ￿ = 1: There will also
be unstable symmetric steady state at (sm;sm); where sm 2 (sl;sh) is the intermediate solution
to (11). Now consider the e⁄ects of increasing integration, starting from this state. For any given
population composition ￿; we shall say that integration is equalizing and welfare-improving if there
15exists some segregation level ^ ￿(￿) such that for all ￿ < ^ ￿(￿) there is no stable asymmetric steady
state, and the initial state (sl;sh) is in the basin of attraction of the high-investment symmetric
steady state (sh;sh). Similarly, we shall say that integration is equalizing and welfare-reducing if
there exists some segregation level ^ ￿(￿) such that for all ￿ < ^ ￿(￿) there is no stable asymmetric
steady state, and (sl;sh) is in the basin of attraction of the low-investment symmetric steady state
(sl;sl). We then have the following result.
Theorem 2. There exist ￿l > 0 and ￿h < 1 such that (i) integration is equalizing and welfare-
improving if ￿ < ￿l and (ii) integration is equalizing and welfare-reducing if ￿ > ￿h:
When local complementarities in the accumulation of human capital are strong enough to
allow for multiple stable steady states under complete segregation, integration can have dramatic
e⁄ects on steady state levels of human capital. Once a threshold level of integration is crossed,
asymmetric steady states may fail to exist, resulting in a transition to equality. As in the case of
homogeneous ability, this can happen in one of two ways: through a sharp decline in the human
capital of the previously advantaged group, or through a sharp increase in the human capital of the
previously disadvantaged group. If the population share of the initially less a› uent group is small
enough, integration can result in group parity (meaning that equally able individuals acquire similar
levels of human capital) and higher average incomes for both groups. Under these conditions, one
should expect broad popular support for integrationist policies. On the other hand, if the initially
disadvantaged group constitutes a large proportion of the total population, parity may be still
attained through integration but costs are higher and human capital levels in both groups decline.
Thus integration may bene￿t the disadvantaged group without harming the advantaged group,
as is suggested by the empirical analysis by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) of the relationship between
segregation and high school graduation rates. But integration may also harm both groups. Thus
the challenges facing policy makers in an urban area such as Baltimore are quite di⁄erent from
those in Bangor or Burlington. Similarly the challenges of assuring group-equal opportunity are
quite di⁄erent in New Zealand, where 15 percent of the population are Maori and South Africa
where the disadvantaged African population constitutes 78 percent of the total.
There is an additional sense in which if group di⁄erences persist in equilibrium integration may
be harmful. The bene￿ts of integration ￿a greater number of high ability disadvantaged individuals
attaining human capital as a result of the lower costs implied by more integrated social networks ￿
may be more than o⁄set by the higher costs imposed on the advantaged group. This will necessarily
be true in the homogeneous ability case in which the lower costs granted to the disadvantaged are
16insu¢ cient to induce any of them to acquire human capital. Where ability levels di⁄er greatly
within groups this less likely, as the number of disadvantaged bene￿ting from the reduced costs will
in this case be considerable.
5 Applications
The theoretical arguments developed here apply quite generally to any society composed of social
groups with distinct identities and some degree of segregation in social interactions. In cases in-
volving a history of institutionalized oppression, segregation can prevent the convergence of income
distributions following a transition from a regime of overt discrimination to one of equal oppor-
tunity. And in cases with no such history, segregation can induce small initial di⁄erences to be
ampli￿ed over time. We next consider some possible applications of this idea.
In Brown v. Board of Education the U.S. Supreme Court (1954) struck down laws enforcing
racial segregation of public schools on the grounds that ￿ separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal￿ . Many hoped that the demise of legally enforced segregation and discrimination against
African Americans during the 1950s and 1960s, coupled with the apparent reduction in racial
prejudice among whites would provide an environment in which signi￿cant social and economic
racial disparities would not persist. But while substantial racial convergence in earnings and incomes
did occur from the 50s to the mid-70s, little progress has since been made. For example, the strong
convergence in median annual income of full time year round male and female African American
workers relative to their white counterparts that occurred between the 1940s and the 1970s was
greatly attenuated or even reversed since the late 70s (President￿ s Council of Economic Advisors,
1991 and 2006). Conditional on the income of their parents, African-Americans receive incomes
substantially (about a third) below those of whites, and this intergenerational race gap has not
diminished appreciably over the past two decades (Hertz, 2005). Similarly, the racial convergence
in years of schooling attained and cognitive scores at given levels of schooling that occurred prior
to 1980 appears not to have continued subsequently (Neal, 2005). Signi￿cant racial di⁄erences in
mortality, wealth, subjective well being, and other indicators also persist (Deaton and Lubotsky,
2003, Wol⁄, 1998, Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 2004).
Enduring discriminatory practices in markets are no doubt part of the explanation (Bobo et
al., 1997, Greenwald et al., 1998, Antonovics 2002, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004, Quillian,
2006). Even in the absence of any form of market discrimination, however, we have shown that
there are mechanisms through which group inequality may be sustained inde￿nitely. Racial segre-
17gation of parenting, friendship networks, mentoring relationships, neighborhoods, workplaces and
schools places the less a› uent group at a disadvantage in acquiring the things ￿contacts, infor-
mation, cognitive skills, behavioral attributes ￿that contribute to economic success. We know
from Schelling (1971) and the subsequent literature that equilibrium racial sorting does not require
overt discrimination and may occur even with pro-integrationist preferences (Sethi and Somanathan
2004).
But is the extent of segregation and the impact of interpersonal spillovers su¢ cient to explain
the persistence of group di⁄erences? Preferentially associating with members of one￿ s own kind
(known as homophily) is a common human trait (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament, 1971) and is
well documented for race and ethnic identi￿cation, religion, and other characteristics. A survey of
recent empirical work reported that:
We ￿nd strong homophily on race and ethnicity in a wide range of relationships, ranging
from the most intimate bonds of marriage and con￿ding, to the more limited ties of
schoolmate friendship and work relations, to the limited networks of discussion about
a particular topic, to the mere fact of appearing in public or ￿ knowing about￿someone
else... Homophily limits peoples￿social worlds in a way that has powerful implications
for the information they receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they
experience (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001, pp. 415, 420).
In a nationally representative sample of 130 schools (and 90,118 students) same-race friendships
were almost twice as likely as cross-race friendships, controlling for school racial composition
(Moody, 2001). Data from one of these schools studied by Jackson, Currarini and Pin (2007), gives
an estimated ￿ of 0.71. In the national sample, by comparison to the friends of white students,
the friends of African American students had signi￿cantly lower grades, attachment to school, and
parental socioeconomic status. Di⁄ering social networks may help explain why Fryer and Levitt
(2006) found that while the white-black cognitive gap among children entering school is readily
explained by a small number of family and socioeconomic covariates, over time black children fall
further behind with a substantial gap appearing by the end of the 3rd grade that is not explained
by observable characteristics.
While there are many channels through which the racial assortation of social networks might
disadvantage members of the less well of group, statistical identi￿cation of these e⁄ects often is an
insurmountable challenge. The reason is that networks are selected by individuals and as a result
18plausible identi￿cation strategies for the estimation of the causal e⁄ect of exogenous variation in
the composition of an individual￿ s networks are di¢ cult to devise. Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek,
Kain, and Rivkin (2002) use the year-to-year cohort variation in racial composition within grade
and school to identify racial network e⁄ects, ￿nding large negative e⁄ects of racial assortation
on the academic achievement of black students. Studies using randomized assignment of college
roommates have also found some important behavioral and academic peer e⁄ects (Kremer and
Levy, 2003, Sacerdote, 2001, Zimmerman and Williams, 2003). A study of annual work hours
using longitudinal data and individual ￿xed e⁄ects found strong neighborhood e⁄ects especially
for the least well educated individuals and the poorest neighborhoods (Weinberg et al., 2004). An
experimental study documents strong peer e⁄ects in a production task, particularly for those with
low productivity in the absence of peers (Falk and Ichino, 2004).
Racial inequality in the United States is rooted in a history of formal oppression backed by the
power of the state. The same cannot be said for the less visible group inequality that may be found
among the descendants of European migrants to the United States. Descendants of Italian, Jewish,
Slavic, and Scotch-Irish immigrants have enjoyed very di⁄erent paths toward economic and social
equality, and substantial income, wealth and occupational inequalities among them have persisted.
There is evidence linking the degree of ethnic identi￿cation among mid western immigrants of
European descent in the mid 19th century with patterns of upward occupational mobility in the
late 20th century, even though the range of actual occupations has changed dramatically over this
period of time (Munshi and Wilson, 2007). This is an example in which some level of segregation
in social relations, mediated through institutions such as churches, could have played a role in
generating and perpetuation ethnic occupational segregation across generations.
Finally, consider the case of group inequality based on regional origin in contemporary South
Korea. The process of rapid industrialization drew large numbers of migrants to metropolitan Seoul
from across the country, with most migrants coming from rural areas. Those from the Youngnam
region gained access to white collar jobs at a signi￿cantly higher rate than those from the Honam
region, even after controlling for productive characteristics (Yu, 1990). The importance of regional
and other group ties in gaining high level managerial positions went beyond discrimination based
on economically irrelevant characteristics, but instead re￿ ected the presumption that ￿social ties
are tangible quali￿cations, and people with such ties ...are (presumptively) competent in the
only relevant sense that counts￿ (Shin and Chin, 1989:19). While contemporary regional group
identities and animosities originated almost two millennia ago, the advantages of the Youngnam
region today have been attributed in part to the fact that the head of state at the time, Park Jung-
19Hee, was from the Youngnam region, and parochialism was instrumental in access to the most
prized administrative and managerial positions. Despite the subsequent transition to democracy
and widespread use of formally meritocratic selection methods in both the economy and school
system, social identities and group inequalities based on regional origin remain signi￿cant, and
may even have become more salient (Ha, 2007). Disparities in the occupational richness of the
respective social networks have allowed initial regional (and region of birth) di⁄erences to persist
and even possibly to widen.
6 Conclusions
While the vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination statutes can eradicate discrimination in mar-
kets and the public sphere, there are many important private interactions that lie outside the scope
of such laws. For instance, a liberal judicial system cannot prohibit discrimination in an individual￿ s
choice of a date, a spouse, an adopted child, a role model, a friend, membership in a voluntary
association, or residence in a neighborhood. Since so much of early childhood learning takes place
in families and peer-groups, segregation in the formation of social networks can have important
implications for the perpetuation of group inequality across generations. Voluntary discrimination
in contact can give rise to persistent group inequality even in the absence of discrimination in
contract.
An important link between social segregation and the dynamics of inequality arises because of
interpersonal spillovers in the accumulation of human capital. Human development always and
everywhere takes place within a social context, and can be greatly facilitated by access to a social
network ￿most importantly, one￿ s parents and siblings ￿that is rich in human capital. As noted
by Lucas (1988), ￿human capital accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in
a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital.￿Under these conditions,
two individuals with identical ability but belonging to di⁄erent social groups may make di⁄erent
investment decisions, and group di⁄erences in social ties can lock in historical group disparities.
This can happen even when human capital is perfectly observable (so there is no basis for statistical
discrimination), and when investments are not limited by credit constraints.
We think it plausible that for some societies in transition, the combined e⁄ect of interpersonal
spillovers in human capital accumulation and own-group bias in the formation of social networks
may be the persistence across generations of group inequality. We have identi￿ed conditions under
which there is a unique and locally unstable symmetric steady state which implies that equal
20opportunity alone cannot ensure the convergence of group outcomes even in the long run. In
fact, when there is no stable state with group equality, even group-redistributive policies cannot
result in long run equalization unless they are sustained inde￿nitely. In this case, if permanent
compensatory group redistribution policies are ruled out, the only viable solution to the problem
of inde￿nite persistence of the e⁄ects of historical discrimination appears to be a commitment to
integration.
But how much greater integration be accomplished in practice? In other words, are there
non-paternalistic ways in which a policy maker could legitimately alter patterns of sorting in the
formation of social connections? We think that there are. First, under quite general conditions
equilibrium sorting produces levels of segregation that are Pareto-ine¢ cient in the sense that an ar-
bitrary reduction in segregation could enhance the well being of members of both groups (Schelling,
1978, Bowles, 2004). In this case policies to reduce, say, neighborhood segregation do not override
individual preferences over aggregate outcomes, but rather allow for their greater satisfaction. Sec-
ond, segregated networks may be the unintended result of current policies. For example the degree
of racial segregation of friendship networks in schools appears to be a⁄ected by the extent of track-
ing, the degree of cross-grade mixing, and the menu of extracurricular activities, all of which are
subject to alteration by school policies (Moody, 2001). However, the most important social a¢ liates
for the formation of human capital are parents and siblings, and these kin networks remain highly
segregated. As long as assortative matching continues to prevail in marriage and child rearing,
there may be quite stringent limits to the degree to which segregation of the relevant networks can
be reduced. Finally, as we observed above, contrary to the assumptions we have made here, the
degree of segregation may be a⁄ected by group di⁄erences in human capital attainments. For this
reason, temporary policies to reduce these di⁄erences, such as lowering the cost to members of the
disadvantaged group of attaining human capital, could reduce segregation of social networks which
in turn would further reduce or eliminate group di⁄erences in levels of human capital.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose (s1
0;s2
0) 2 [0;1]2 is given. Then, using (1) and (2), s0 2 [0;1]
and (￿1
0;￿1
0) 2 [0;1]2 are uniquely de￿ned. De￿ne the function ’(s) as follows:
’(s) = ￿(1 ￿ G(~ a(￿(s);￿1
t￿1))) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ G(~ a(￿(s);￿2
t￿1))):
Note that ’(0) = 1, ’(1) = 0 and ’(s) is strictly decreasing. Hence, given (￿1
0;￿2
0); there exists a
unique value of s such that s = ’(s). Note from (1) and (4) that in equilibrium, s1 must satisfy
s1 = ’(s1); so s1 is uniquely determined. The pair (s1
1;s2
1) is then also uniquely determined from
(4). The second claim follows from (4) and (2), since ~ a is decreasing in its second argument.
Proof of Proposition 2. If (5) is satis￿ed, then there is a unique steady state in the single
group case. From Proposition 1, there exists a unique competitive equilibrium path for any initial
condition s0; which we may write as st = f(st￿1): A necessary and su¢ cient condition for stability
of the steady state is that jf0j < 1 at this state. Write (6) as follows:
f(st￿1) = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿(f(st￿1));st￿1):
Hence f0 = ￿G0(~ a1￿0f0 + ~ a2): Using this, together with (5), we get
￿ ￿f0￿ ￿ =
G0 j~ a2j
1 + G0~ a1￿0 <
G0 j~ a2j
1 + G0 j~ a2j
< 1
at the unique steady state. Hence the steady state is locally stable.
Proof of Theorem 1. The stability of the (unique) symmetric steady state under the dynamics











evaluated at the steady state. Speci￿cally the state is stable if all eigenvalues of J lie within the
unit circle, and unstable if at least one eigenvalue lies outside it. From (8), we get
f1
1 = ￿G0 ￿
~ a1￿0 ￿
￿f1
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)f2
1
￿




2 = ￿G0 ￿
~ a1￿0 ￿
￿f1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)f2
2
￿




1 = ￿G0 ￿
~ a1￿0 ￿
￿f1
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)f2
1
￿




2 = ￿G0 ￿
~ a1￿0 ￿
￿f1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)f2
2
￿
+ ~ a2 (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))
￿
(16)










1 = ￿￿G0 ￿
~ a1￿0!1 + ~ a2 (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)f2
1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)G0 ￿
~ a1￿0!1 + ~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
Adding these two equations, we get
!1 = ￿G0 ￿
~ a1￿0!1 + ~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿~ a2￿
￿
= ￿G0 ￿





1 + G0~ a1￿0: (17)
De￿ne ￿ 2 (0;1) as follows
￿ =
G0~ a1￿0
1 + G0~ a1￿0: (18)
Hence, from (13) and (15),
f1
1 = ￿G0~ a2 (￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿));
f2
1 = ￿G0~ a2￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿):
Now consider
￿f1
2 = ￿￿G0 ￿
~ a1￿0!2 + ~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)f2
2 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)G0 ￿
~ a1￿0!2 + ~ a2 (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))
￿
Adding these two equations, we get
!2 = ￿G0~ a1￿0!2 ￿ G0~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)G0~ a2￿;
= ￿G0~ a1￿0!2 ￿ G0~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿);
so
!2 = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)G0~ a2
1 + G0~ a1￿0 :
Hence, from (14) and (16),
f1
2 = ￿G0~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿);
f2
2 = ￿G0~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)):
23The Jacobean J is therefore
J = ￿G0~ a2
2
4 ￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
3
5:
It can be veri￿ed that the eigenvalues of J are
￿1 = ￿G0~ a2￿;
￿2 = ￿G0~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿);





Hence, using (5), we get
￿2 = ￿G0~ a2 (1 ￿ ￿) < G0~ a1￿0 (1 ￿ ￿) = ￿ < 1
Since ￿2 < 1 for all parameter values, and both eigenvalues are positive, the steady state is locally
asymptotically stable if ￿1 < 1 and unstable if ￿1 > 1: Applying assumption (9) immediately yields
the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. At the state
￿
s1;s2￿
= (0;1); the mean skill share is s = 1 ￿ ￿ from
(1). Hence, using (2), we get
￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿);
￿2 = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿):
Since c is decreasing in its second argument, c(￿ a;￿1) is increasing in ￿ and c(￿ a;￿2) is decreasing
in ￿: Under complete integration (￿ = 0) we have ￿1 = ￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿; and the costs of human
capital accumulation are therefore c(￿ a;1 ￿ ￿) for both groups. Under complete segregation, ￿ = 1
and hence ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 1: Hence under complete segregation, the costs of human capital
accumulation are c(￿ a;0) and c(￿ a;1) for the two groups respectively, where c(￿ a;1) < ￿ ￿ < c(￿ a;0) by
assumption.




< ￿ ￿ when ￿ = 0; it satis￿es c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿
< ￿ ￿ for all ￿: Since c(￿ a;￿1) is increasing in
￿ and satis￿es c(￿ a;￿1) < ￿ ￿ at ￿ = 0 and c(￿ a;￿1) > ￿ ￿ at ￿ = 1; there exists a unique ^ ￿(￿) such that
c(￿ a;￿1) = ￿ ￿: For all ￿ > ^ ￿(￿); we have c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿




is a stable steady state. For all ￿ < ^ ￿(￿); we have c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿
< c(￿ a;￿1) < ￿ ￿; which implies that
24￿
s1;s2￿
= (0;1) cannot be a steady state. Note that any increase in ￿ within the range ￿ < ~ ￿ raises
c(￿ a;￿1): Since c(￿ a;￿1) is increasing in ￿; this lowers the value of ^ ￿(￿); de￿ned as the segregation
level at which c(￿ a;￿1) = ￿ ￿:
Next consider the case ￿ > ~ ￿; which implies c(￿ a;1 ￿ ￿) > 0: Since c(￿ a;￿1) is increasing in ￿








= ￿ ￿: For all ￿ > ^ ￿(￿); we have c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿




is a stable steady state. For all ￿ < ^ ￿(￿); we have ￿ ￿ < c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿
< c(￿ a;￿1); which implies that
￿
s1;s2￿







is decreasing in ￿; this raises the value of ^ ￿(￿); de￿ned as the segregation




Proof of Proposition 4. First consider the case ￿ < ~ ￿: Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that
if the economy is initially at
￿
s1;s2￿
= (0;1); then for all ￿ < ^ ￿(￿); we have c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿
< c(￿ a;￿1) < ￿ ￿:
Hence all individuals in each of the two groups will ￿nd it optimal to invest in human capital,
resulting in a transition to
￿
s1;s2￿
= (1;1): This lowers both c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿
and c(￿ a;￿1); and hence
maintains the condition c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿









= (0;1); then for all ￿ < ^ ￿(￿); we have ￿ ￿ < c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿
< c(￿ a;￿1): Hence




= (0;0): This raises both c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿
and c(￿ a;￿1); and hence maintains the
condition ￿ ￿ < c
￿
￿ a;￿2￿




Proof of Theorem 2. Using (1￿ 4), we may write the dynamics of investment levels s1 and s2 as
follows
s1
t = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;￿s1
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿s1
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)s2
t￿1))
s2
t = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;￿s2
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿s1
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)s2
t￿1))
For each s2; de￿ne hb(s2) as the set of all s1 satisfying
s1 = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;￿s1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿s1 + (1 ￿ ￿)s2)):
This corresponds to the set of isoclines for group 1, namely the set of points at which ￿s1 ￿
s1
t ￿ s1
t￿1 = 0 for any given s2: Similarly, for each s1, de￿ne hw(s1) as the set of all s2 satisfying
s2 = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;￿s2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿s1 + (1 ￿ ￿)s2)):
25This is the set of points at which ￿s2 = 0 for any given s1:Any state (s1;s2) at which s1 2 hb(s2)
and s2 2 hw(s1) is a steady state. Now consider the extreme case ￿ = 0; and examine the limiting
isoclines as ￿ ! 0: In this case hb(s2) is the set of all s1 satisfying
s1 = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;s2))
and hw(s1) is the set of all s2 satisfying
s2 = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;s2)):
There are exactly three solutions, sl; sm; and sh to the latter equation. Hence there are three
horizontal isoclines at which ￿s2 = 0; as shown in the left panel of Figure 3. The former equation
generates a single isocline s1 = hb(s2) which is strictly increasing, and satis￿es hb(0) 2 (0;sl);
hb(1) 2 (sh;1); and hb(s) = s for each s 2 fsl;sm;shg; also depicted in the left panel of Figure 3.
As is clear from the ￿gure, only three steady states exist, all of which are symmetric. Only two of
these, (sl;sl) and (sh;sh) are stable. The initial state (sl;sh) is in the basin of attraction of of the
high investment steady state (sh;sh). Since the isoclines are all continuous in ￿ and ￿ at ￿ = ￿ = 0;
it follows that for ￿ su¢ ciently small, integration is equalizing and welfare-improving.
Next consider the limiting isoclines as ￿ ! 1 (maintaining the assumption that ￿ = 0): In this
case hb(s2) is the set of all s1 satisfying
s1 = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;s1))
and hw(s1) is the set of all s2 satisfying
s2 = 1 ￿ G(~ a(￿ ￿;s1)):
There are exactly three solutions, sl; sm; and sh to the former equation. Hence there are three
vertical isoclines at which ￿s1 = 0; as shown in the right panel of Figure 3. The latter equation
generates a single isocline s2 = hw(s1) which is strictly increasing, and satis￿es hw(0) 2 (0;sl);
hw(1) 2 (sh;1); and hw(s) = s for each s 2 fsl;sm;shg; also depicted in the right panel of Figure 3.
As in the case of ￿ = 0; only three steady states exist, all of which are symmetric and two of which,
(sl;sl) and (sh;sh); are stable. The initial state (sl;sh) is in the basin of attraction of of the low
investment steady state (sl;sl). Since the isoclines are all continuous in ￿ and ￿ at ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ = 0;





Figure 3. Limiting Isoclines for ￿ = 0; with ￿ ! 0 (left) and ￿ ! 1 (right).
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